A Logical Approach to Cloud Federation by Cao, Qiang et al.
A Logical Approach to Cloud Federation*
Qiang Cao, Yuanjun Yao, Jeff Chase
Duke University
Abstract
Federated clouds raise a variety of challenges for manag-
ing identity, resource access, naming, connectivity, and
object access control. This paper shows how to address
these challenges in a comprehensive and uniform way
using a data-centric approach. The foundation of our ap-
proach is a trust logic in which participants issue authenti-
cated statements about principals, objects, attributes, and
relationships in a logic language, with reasoning based on
declarative policy rules. We show how to use the logic to
implement a trust infrastructure for cloud federation that
extends the model of NSF GENI, a federated IaaS testbed.
It captures shared identity management, GENI authority
services, cross-site interconnection using L2 circuits, and
a naming and access control system similar to AWS Iden-
tity and Access Management (IAM), but extended to a
federated system without central control.
1 Introduction
The IaaS market today is dominated by a small number of
megaproviders, which compete on price and services for
market position, and face disincentives to combine their
offerings. However, as the technology develops, some
speculate that cloud providers will face natural market in-
centives to interconnect their service offerings (cloud peer-
ing), leading to the emergence of an “intercloud” follow-
ing the historical development of infrastructure networks
including the Internet and the power grid [29]. Peering en-
ables providers to shift load to absorb demand spikes. The
IBM Reservoir project [44, 45] and others popularized
this model.
An overlapping trend is the emergence of multi-cloud
applications that span multiple providers. They occur
naturally in cloud peering scenarios, but cloud adopters
may also use multiple providers to manage cost or risk.
Multi-clouds are also attractive for peer-to-peer applica-
tion platforms and for services that benefit from proximity
*This paper is based upon work supported by the US National
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to the edge of the network (cloudlet, fog, or locavore com-
puting). The multi-cloud model was also popularized
as “sky computing” [33]. Various efforts have sought to
develop stacks and standards to launch, manage and/or
migrate application networks seamlessly and safely across
multiple clouds: these include the Open Cloud Comput-
ing Interface (OCCI) [41], various research works (e.g.,
[48]), and Cisco’s Intercloud Fabric offerings [21].
A decade ago the research community launched ma-
jor initiatives to combine network testbeds to leverage
benefits of scale, diversity, geographic dispersion, and
heterogeneity. NSF GENI [11, 14] in the US and FIRE in
the EU exemplify this trend. Both initiatives have funded
deployment of IaaS federations spanning many sites and
providers. They also embody a third dimension of fed-
eration: they serve a common community of member
researchers, requiring some form of federated identity
for their users (a community cloud [39]). Other recent
efforts take a similar approach to linking accounts across
providers (e.g., [19]).
These three dimensions of cloud federation—peering,
multi-cloud, and community—present a common set of
overlapping challenges for identity, trust, access, and gov-
ernance. Federation requires some means to represent
and certify trust relationships among users and providers,
including their terms of peering. It also places new pres-
sure on the mechanisms to manage multi-tenancy, in-
cluding naming, ownership, and access control of pro-
tected cloud objects (machine instances, virtual storage
objects, networks), and accounting and accountability for
the use of resources. The US government has identified
federated/community/multi-cloud scenarios as a priority
area for standards, focusing on “credentials, namespaces,
and trust infrastructure” [6].
This paper takes a comprehensive approach to trust
infrastructure for cloud federation. We advocate a data-
centric approach that captures the attributes and relation-
ships of identities and objects, with trust and authorization
based on queries over the data model. Our approach is
fully decentralized: participants exchange certificates with
statements in a logic language, and issue local queries
against locally cached sets of relevant assertions and
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declarative policy rules. It provides end-to-end autho-
rization [28]: each participant can verify for itself that its
interactions comply with its policy based on statements
that it has received from other parties. We use a simpli-
fied trust logic based on Datalog—a well-studied logic
language with a rigorous semantics [16]—within a novel
system for managing certificates.
This paper uses the architecture of the GENI deploy-
ment as a model for federation. It addresses key issues
of federated identity, trust, governance, and coordination
that are common to peering, multi-cloud, and community
federation scenarios. We show how to capture the GENI
trust model using logic, and extend it with access control
for protected objects, using features similar to those in
Amazon’s Identity and Access Management (IAM [5]),
but built for a multi-cloud scenario. Finally, we show
how to authorize linked private networks (virtual private
clouds or VPCs) in a multi-cloud, cross-tenant peering
of VPC networks, and more complex cross-federation
structures.
The contributions of this paper include:
• Specify trust and naming for federated IaaS scenar-
ios in a way that captures the naming and trust model
of the existing GENI deployment. We show how to
use logic to frame the design issues and specify solu-
tions in a way that is concise, precise, and verifiable.
• Demonstrate use of trust logic as an implementa-
tion technology for federated clouds. The logical
specification is directly deployable using the SAFE
framework [15] to manage the exchange of logic con-
tent as linked certificates, and execute trust queries
against assembled sets of logic statements. (See §2.)
• Evaluate the performance of logical federation. Mi-
crobenchmarks and synthetic workloads show that
key trust operations are fast enough to be practical
in a deployment: they are at least an order of magni-
tude faster than the typical cost of the operations they
protect, e.g., instantiating or linking cloud resources.
2 Overview
This paper describes a trust core for cloud federation using
logic (“CFlo”) based on the SAFE logical trust framework.
SAFE factors trust concerns out of the cloud services
and tools, and isolates them in application-supplied logic
scripts. We implemented CFlo in about 600 lines of SAFE
scripting code, including logic templates for all credential
formats, exemplary policy rules, and compliance queries.
The scripts implement a trust API to manage credentials
and make trust decisions (see Table 1). The scripts run in
a SAFE interpreter engine that is local to each participant
and under its direct control.
This paper is not about SAFE itself, which is the topic
of a companion paper [15]. Rather, it is about using logi-
cal trust to address a range of issues in cloud federation.
SAFE provides an exemplary trust logic language and sys-
tem that enables us to evaluate how CFlo would perform
in a real deployment.
GENI. The design of SAFE was motivated by our
experience in applying logical trust in the development
of GENI. Although GENI was conceived as a network
testbed, it is best understood as a federation of au-
tonomous IaaS providers (“aggregates”) linked by various
trust relationships and agreements. GENI serves a com-
munity of registered researchers with various institutional
and project affiliations. Each provider has various policies
governing client access. These policies consider endorse-
ments and delegations of trust among the participants,
including a root trust anchor that certifies the aggregates
and various authority services to govern membership and
coordination. In this respect GENI is representative of
federated cloud systems in general, although there are
differences in terminology.
GENI uses the slice abstraction for multi-cloud sce-
narios, first introduced in PlanetLab [42]. A slice is a
logical container for a set of virtual resources (e.g., VMs,
network links) that may span multiple providers and are
allocated and used for a common purpose. A sliver is a
typed virtual resource unit that is provisioned from a sin-
gle aggregate and is named and managed independently
of other slivers. Each sliver is bound to exactly one slice
at the time that the sliver is created. Users may link slivers
from multiple providers to form end-to-end environments
(slices) for networked applications.
ExoGENI. One goal of CFlo is to extend ExoGENI [9,
7] to enable richer forms of cross-tenant interaction,
including discretionary access control for slivers and
cross-slice network peering. ExoGENI is a federation of
xCAT/OpenStack cloud clusters on 20 campuses, linked
by the Internet2 AL2S and ESnet network circuit fab-
rics. It supports elastic multi-cloud slices with private net-
works (VPCs constructed by stitching VLANs at layer2)
that may be tenant-managed via OpenFlow. It automates
end-to-end assembly of the slice VPC dataplane across
multiple providers [8]. To do this, it provisions cross-
cloud circuits on demand, bridging among circuit fabrics
at exchange points (e.g., at Starlight) as needed. As of
February 2017 ExoGENI has supported over 56,000 ex-
periments/slices submitted by more than 1400 distinct
users.
To integrate CFlo into ExoGENI, we must modify its
control servers to invoke CFlo APIs in a local SAFE en-
gine to check each action for compliance with a trust
policy before executing it. Beyond enabling new func-
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Method Description
root.endorseAggregate(PID) Issue root endorsement for an aggregate (infrastructure provider).
root.endorseAuthority(PID, type) Issue root endorsement for an authority service to certify users (MA), projects (PA), or
tenants (slices: SA).
PA.createProject(ownerPID, attributes)
returns projectID
Create a project with owner ownerPID, checking its permission. This is an API call of a
Project Authority (PA).
member(PID, projectID, role, delegatable) Delegate project membership to PID with a named role.
SA.createSlice( ownerPID, projectID,
attributes) returns sliceID
Create a slice (tenant) with owner ownerPID in a project, checking its permission. This is
an API call of a Slice Authority (SA).
delegateSlice(PID, sliceID, perms,
delegatable)
Delegate named permissions to operate on a slice.
Agg.createSliver( sliceID, attributes) Check requester’s permission to instantiate virtual infrastructure at this aggregate for use by
a slice.
Agg.sliceOperation( sliceID, type,
attributes)
Check requester’s permission to perform a control action on a slice’s resources at this aggre-
gate.
createNameEntry(dirID, <component>, targetID) Create a name for targetID in naming context of dirID. The caller must control dirID.
resolveName( <pathname>) returns ID Resolve a multi-component pathname, which may cross domain boundaries.
createGroup() returns GID Create a new empty group and return its scid.
groupMember(GID, PID, delegatable) Grant membership in group GID to principal PID; delegatable is a boolean that deter-
mines whether transitive delegation is permitted.
checkAccess( subjectID, targetID) Check whether a principal or group with subjectID has the right to access an object with
targetID.
Table 1: Simplified trust API for CFlo, a logical trust core for use by participants in a federated IaaS.
tionality, CFlo can place the existing security and peering
mechanisms in ExoGENI on a more uniform and extensi-
ble foundation.
Scope. The CFlo trust scripts implement the GENI
trust core in logic. For this paper, we added script support
for user groups, hierarchical names, and access control
for cloud objects (e.g., ACLs for virtual network links),
all modeled on AWS Identity and Access Management
(AWS-IAM [5]). We also added logic for authorization
that takes place during VPC stitching in ExoGENI, and
combined it with ACLs to enable network peering among
tenant VPCs by mutual consent. This paper does not
address how the underlying operations (VPCs, L2 stitch-
ing) are implemented and orchestrated; refer to [7, 20].
We also do not address resource discovery, resource bro-
kering, or payment models. ExoGENI is based on our
earlier work on these topics (e.g., [26]). Integrating these
mechanisms with logical trust is future work.
2.1 Building with Trust Logic
Logical trust has a long history in the research commu-
nity [2, 34, 23, 31, 38, 22, 3, 1, 46]. (See §5.) Like many
logical trust systems, SAFE is a credentials-based PKI
system. Each principal has a keypair to authenticate its
requests and sign any credentials that it issues. Partic-
ipants exchange security assertions and policy rules as
semantically rich logic-based certificates, and run a local
engine to generate proofs of policy compliance end-to-
end. Certificates have a period of validity that is checked
along with the signature on import or use: the prover sees
only logic content that is fresh and authentic.
SAFE’s trust logic is based on Datalog [16], a rigor-
ously defined and extensively studied general-purpose
logic language that is a subset of Prolog, a popular lan-
guage for logic programming with a standard syntax. It
adds a modal operator says to Datalog, enabling its di-
rect use as a logic of belief and attribution, following
Binder [22], SD3 [31], and SENDLOG [3].
Datalog content consists of atomic statements (atoms)
and rules built up from atoms and the logical operators
conjunction and implication. An atom is a predicate sym-
bol applied to a list of parameters, which may be vari-
ables or term constants representing principals, objects,
or values. Predicate symbols are user-defined: they may
represent properties, attributes, roles, relationships, rights,
powers, or permissions. Atoms whose parameters are
term constants (ground) represent simple assertions equiv-
alent to a row of a database table. Rules embody implica-
tion and may contain variables. A rule has a head and a
body. The head of a rule is a single atom. The body is a
sequence of atoms (goals) separated by commas, which
indicate conjunction: all of the atoms in the body must be
true for the rule to “fire”. A rule allows the prover to infer
that the head is true for some substitution of its variables
with constants, if the body is true under that substitution.
In Datalog-with-says, every atom has a first (prefix) pa-
rameter representing a principal who says it (the speaker).
If the parameter is omitted, it defaults to the current prin-
cipal ($Self). In this way, a statement about a principal
naturally represents a delegation or endorsement that is
restricted by the speaker and predicate; another principal
considers the statement only if it has a policy rule with a
matching goal, conferring trust in the speaker.
Datalog-with-says is sufficiently powerful to repre-
sent common access control features hierarchical naming,
nested groups, roles and other attribute assertions, ACLs,
and capabilities. Delegations may be constrained by a
predicate/role and by parameters (e.g., “Alice owns file
F”). Conjunctive policy rules permit reasoning from mul-
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tiple attributes of a principal or object, and policies are
mobile: they may be passed in certificates.
SAFE defines conventions for self-certifying term con-
stants (IDs) to name principals and objects. A principalID
is a SHA hash of the principal’s public key, following
SPKI/SDSI [23]. All statements in a valid certificate must
have a speaker ID that matches the issuer who signed the
certificate. Each object named in a logic statement has
some principal who is its controlling authority. The objec-
tID consists of an identifier (a UUID/GUID) chosen by its
authority, concatenated with the authority’s principalID to
form a self-certifying identifier (scid). SAFE scripts use
a builtin function rootID to obtain a scid’s controlling
principalID. Self-certifying IDs ensure that parties have
distinct names for their objects, and a malicious princi-
pal cannot “hijack” another’s names. In this way logical
trust extends conventional identity-based PKI security to
incorporate rich statements about principals, objects and
their security attributes, and avoids the need for a global
naming root.
2.2 SAFE Logic Scripting
SAFE synthesizes elements from previous trust logic sys-
tems and extends them with additional system support
to enable practical deployment. The novel elements of
SAFE include a scripting language to insulate applica-
tions from logic concerns, and an interface to a shared
key-value store (e.g., a DHT), which stores authenticated
logic content as signed certificates in a native SAFE for-
mat. Certificates in the store are indexed by self-certifying
links (tokens), and can be written only by their issuers.
The application trust scripts contain parameterized logic
templates to generate certificates easily, and also to link
certificates to construct DAGs programmatically as a side
effect of delegations.
This use of certificate linking simplifies discovery and
retrieval of the content relevant to a trust decision. The
certificate links (tokens) also enable pass-by-reference
and caching of certificate content at the authorizers. The
shared certificate store enables an issuer to update or
revoke its certificates by their tokens, addressing common
PKI concerns.
Scripting is organized around the abstraction of logic
sets — sets of logic statements that represent credentials,
delegations, endorsements, and policies. Scripts use tem-
plated constructors (defcon) to construct and modify sets
and link them to form unions.
A principal may issue (post) its logic sets and share
them by reference; posted sets are materialized as certifi-
cates spoken by the issuer and signed under its keypair. A
posted set is accessible to any client that knows its token,
but only its issuer can modify it. Scripts name their lo-
cally constructed sets with arbitrary string names (labels);
the token is a SHA hash of the issuer ID and the label.
Thus tokens are “unguessable”, but anyone who knows
the label and the issuer’s public key can synthesize a set’s
token. Some CFlo script actions (e.g., name resolution)
obtain links in this way.
SAFE guard scripts (defguard) combine linked sets
to construct query contexts, and issue queries to check
policy compliance for trust decisions. SAFE fetches a
certificate when a guard references a logic set by its token.
After validation SAFE extracts the semantic content of
the certificate into a logic set cached in an in-memory set
cache. The scripts deal only with the semantic content:
the SAFE runtime encodes and decodes logic material,
handles cryptographic operations, and performs fetch,
retrieval, and caching automatically and transparently.
We assume that all CFlo participants run scripts with
common logic/certificate templates, although they may
install different policy rule sets. (This assumption assures
interoperability, but it is not required for security.) Each
participant’s TCB includes the interpreter and scripts,
which are all under its direct control: authorization is
naturally end-to-end [28].
3 Logical Cloud Federation
Cloud peering and multi-cloud models raise the question
of how providers are qualified to serve users, and the
degree of trust that users have in them. The community
model raises the question of how providers authenticate
consumers (users), qualify them for service, and hold
them accountable for their actions in the cloud. A user’s
privilege at a provider is based on membership and roles
within organizations, relationships and agreements among
organizations and providers, and community policies and
provider policies for authorization and resource manage-
ment. These affiliations, roles, relationships, and policies
may be dynamic.
This trust information flows from organizational pro-
cesses outside the scope of the trust system, but the system
must capture it and reason about it. Key aspects of trust
in federated systems reduce to choices about whose asser-
tions to believe or whose commands to accept. Trust logic
offers a formalism to represent these choices. This section
presents examples from CFlo to illustrate this power and
flexibility and to expose key issues and techniques for
cloud federation. They also illustrate the role of linking
to organize sets and certificates in SAFE; some links and
labels are omitted or simplified for brevity. Figure 1 and 2
illustrate some linking patterns relevant to this section.
Listing 1: Example of a logic template in a constructor: endorse a
principal (?User) as a registered member of the federation and as a
leader who is empowered to create and manage project groups.
defcon endorseLeader(?User) :- {
fedUser($User).
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Figure 1: Groups, naming, and slivers in CFlo and their set linking patterns. In CFlo groups, links traverse group member delegation
and group policies. In CFlo naming, links traverse the name entry delegation and parent objects. Slivers link to ACL set, zone, and the
containing slice. A slice also links to its containing project, which further links to a policy package and to credentials of its endorsing
authority. The logic scripts form the graphs naturally by leaving “back links” as a side effect of delegation.
GENI root 
	 	
	 	
	 	
	 	
SA0 
PA0 project0 
slice0 slice1 
slice2 
	
	 	
	
PI0 
User0 
MA0 
project1 
	
	
PI1 
GENI authority layer 
Figure 2: Linking patterns for CFlo sets/certificates in the GENI-
derived trust model. Users, projects, and slices link to their endors-
ing authorities; slices link to their projects; users and leaders (PIs
in the figure) link to the projects they own and/or have membership
in.
fedLeader($User).
}.
Listing 1 shows how to generate a logic set from a
template in a script. This rule defines a set constructor
(defcon), which returns a logic set formed by substitut-
ing script variables in a template. Each item listed within
the brackets is a logic statement with an application-
defined predicate asserting an attribute for this user: the
value of the ?User variable resolves to the user’s Prin-
cipalID and is substituted in the template using the $
operator.
The set is materialized as a certificate signed by its
issuer, the principal executing the script ($Self). If an-
other principal (an authorizer) imports the certificate, its
prover sees each statement within the set as spoken by
the authenticated issuer. Any principal may issue an en-
dorsement, but an authorizer considers them according to
its policy rules to determine whether or not to accept any
given statement based on the identity of its speaker.
Listing 2: Policy rules to accept user endorsements from any principal
that is endorsed as Member Authority by a federation root trust anchor
accepted by the local configuration.
defcon registeredUserPolicy() :- {
fedUser(?U) :- mAuthority(?MA), ?MA: fedUser(?U).
fedLeader(?U) :- mAuthority(?MA), ?MA: fedLeader(?U).
mAuthority(?MA) :- fedRoot(?R), ?R: mAuthority(?MA).
}.
In this case, policy rules reject such endorsements un-
less they are issued by a Member Authority service en-
dorsed by a federation trust anchor, as specified by the
policy in Listing 2. These statements are policy rules: the
terms ?U, ?MA, and ?R are variables. These rules specify
conditions to accept that a given principal is a registered
user in the federation with the attribute fedUser and/or
fedLeader. The first rule concludes that a ?U (whose
value is the principalID of a user) is a member only if
some principal ?MA says that ?U is a member and ?MA is
locally accepted as a Member Authority (MA).
The other rules in Listing 2 have a similar structure.
These rules are examples of attribute-based delegation:
they accept statements based on the attributes of their
speakers. The third rule says that a principal is accepted
as an MA only if a fedRoot trust anchor says that it is
an MA. A server’s operator may configure its accepted
trust anchors by asserting them as fedRoot facts. Given
a certificate from a configured root anchor endorsing an
MA, and a certificate from the MA endorsing a user, these
rules accept the user endorsement.
This example shows how to establish authority ser-
vices in a federation to certify users (and providers) and
attest to their attributes. The MA bases its assertions
on external information about the users, e.g., from a
Web identity (SSO) protocol such as OAUTH or Shib-
boleth/SAML [40]. For example, GENI runs a portal
service that harvests attributes about each academic user
from a Shibboleth identity provider (IdP) at the user’s
institution. Once logged in, the user may supply a profile
and accept required conditions. If the user provides its key
hash, the portal may issue endorsements to approve its
principalID as a federation user (fedUser) or a research
team leader (fedLeader) based on attributes supplied by
the IdP (e.g., user is a faculty member).
In this example the participants accept authorities en-
dorsed by a common trust anchor, but they might instead
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configure local policies for accepting authorities. They
might select a locally accepted set, or subscribe to multi-
ple root anchors.
Listing 3: Set/certificate constructor for a typed user-defined group
object owned by a specified subject and linked to a set of policy rules
controlling delegation of rights to this object.
defcon createGroup(?SubjId, ?GroupId, ?Policy) :- {
owner($SubjId, $GroupId).
group($GroupId).
link($Policy).
}.
Listing 4: Set/certificate constructor to delegate membership in a group
to a subject. A boolean indicates whether the receiver may delegate it
further.
defcon addMember(?GroupId, ?SubjId, ?Delegable) :- {
groupMember($GroupId, $SubjId, $Delegable).
link($GroupSetRef).
}.
3.1 Groups, Names, and Authority
It is often useful for participants to assert their own at-
tributes about one another. For example, AWS-IAM pro-
vides a rich API for user-defined groups, a common basis
for access control. In CFlo, any principal may declare a
group as an object, and issue certificates granting owner-
ship or membership in the group with named privileges or
roles. Members may delegate their rights to others tran-
sitively using a capability model. CFlo uses a standard
set of logic rules (not shown) to govern this delegation
by checking endorsement chains similar to the rules in
Listing 2. The rule set is linked to the group, and may be
customized, e.g., to manage specific roles or privileges.
Listing 3 shows a constructor to create a group, and
Listing 4 shows a simple constructor to grant member-
ship in a group. When invoked with concrete IDs as
parameters, these constructors return sets with logical as-
sertions declaring the existence of the group, its owner
and members, and its governing policy set. These sets
may be posted as linked certificates, enabling other parties
to query group memberships, e.g., to control access.
Listing 5: Constructor to install a human-readable name for an object.
The name is resolvable relative to the parent object which acts as a
directory.
defcon createName(?Name, ?ObjectID, ?ParentID) :- {
link(token($ParentID)).
nameEntry($Name, $ObjectID, $ParentID).
label("$ParentID/$Name").
}.
A principal may also issue a symbolic string name for
any ID, specifying any object that it controls to serve
as a parent context for the name (i.e., a directory). List-
ing 5 shows a constructor that generates a set with the
name entry as a logic statement. When posted as a cer-
tificate, its token is hashed from the parentID and name
string. A resolution procedure can synthesize this token
and retrieve the set to look up the objectID by its name,
given the parentID. The named object may itself act as a
parent/directory for another component of a hierarchical
pathname.
These primitives enable a common namespace of
groups and other objects that span principals (naming
domains). Because the named object in Listing 5 may
be controlled by a different principal, the name space is
federated in a structure equivalent to DNSSEC [31]. CFlo
includes a script to resolve and certify hierarchical names
relative to a root object chosen by the caller. To share a
common name space, participants must choose a common
root by some convention, as with DNSSEC. A federation
may certify the naming authority as with the Member
Authority example in Listing 2. A common naming root
enables CFlo to create a name space equivalent to the
URN conventions used in GENI [14], which relies on an
external service—DNS.
In the same way, a federation may wish to designate
authorities to control the creation of groups used for
federation-mandated access policies, as opposed to user-
defined policies. GENI takes this approach to manage
an authoritative space of project groups to organize user
activity. Creating a GENI-sanctioned project is an action
reserved to a designated authority role—Project Author-
ity (PA)—which serves requests to create projects and is
endorsed by the federation root.
A PA restricts the creation of projects to qualified
users—for example, users qualified as research team lead-
ers as shown in Listing 1 by the fedLeader attribute.
This is important because all user activity in GENI is
associated with a project, and the project leader is ac-
countable for that activity.
Listing 6: Policy guard used by a federation-approved Project Authority
(PA) to authorize a request to create a project group.
defcon projectPolicySet() :- {
approveProject(?Owner) :- fedLeader(?Owner).
label("policy-name").
}.
defguard createProject() :- {
link($AnchorSet).
link(token("policy-name")).
link($BearerRef).
approveProject($Subject)?
}.
Listing 6 gives a simple example of a policy guard to
enforce this restriction, including a simple policy rule set
linked by a standard label. The PA server invokes the
defguard action in Listing 6 on a request. The guard
creates a set of statements, similarly to the constructor
examples, and then issues an approveProject query
against this set (the query context). The query is a guard
condition: if it is provable, then the request is approved,
else it is denied. The policy rule at line 2 concludes
approveProject if the project owner (in this case the
$Subject who issued the request) is a fedLeader, as
governed by the rules in Listing 2.
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The guard imports all of the needed rules through
links to the policy set (line 8) and to the authorizer’s
AnchorSet (line 7), its set of configured facts (e.g., trust
anchors) and rules, including the rules in Listing 2. It
also imports a standard BearerRef variable, which re-
solves to a token that must be passed by the requester. For
example, if the requester passes a link to the certificate
issued in Listing 1 (or any set that links to it), then the
guard fetches the MA’s endorsement assertions into the
context. These in turn link to the root’s certification of
the MA, enabling the query to succeed. This example
illustrates the power of certificate linking in assembling
a query context for a guard. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate
linking patterns for CFlo.
3.2 Resource Access
To determine whether or not to approve a given request
for resources, a provider policy may consider the purpose
and authority of the request as well as the identity and
attributes of the requester. In GENI, every request for
resources (i.e., a sliver) is linked to a slice, and every slice
is linked to a project. The project and slice are objects that
may have arbitrary attributes associated with them (e.g.,
high priority, top secret) by their controlling authorities.
Since a provider’s policies may use these attributes to
govern resource access and accounting, the provider must
accept the authorities that certify them, e.g., they must be
federation-approved like the MA in Listing 2 and the PA
in Listing 6. GENI defines a third authority role (Slice
Authority, SA) to approve creation of slices. As with
all of the authority types, there may be many SAs in the
federation. Providers may choose which authorities to
accept, and they may consider attributes of the authorities
as well in their policy decisions.
Listing 7: Guard rule for a federation-approved Slice Authority (SA) to
authorize a request to create a slice.
defcon guardPolicySliceCreate() :- {
approveSlice(?Subj, ?Proj) :-
?PA := rootID(?Proj),
projectAuthority(?PA),
?PA: group(?Proj),
?PA: memberPriv(?Subj, ?Proj, instantiate, _).
}.
Listing 7 shows an exemplary policy rule used by an
SA guard to create a slice. To approve a request, the SA
must be convinced that it is associated with a valid project
group (line 5) approved by an eligible PA (line 4), and
that the subject has permission within the project to bind
a slice to it according to the project policies (line 6).
Listing 7 illustrates the use of the RootID builtin to
obtain the ID of the controlling principal (the PA) for the
project from its object ID. Like all objects, the project ID
is named by a self-certifying identifier that incorporates
the principal ID. It also illustrates how a policy rule can
delegate policy control to rules issued by another principal
(the PA) and evaluated locally (policy mobility). The
PA’s policy rules for the project group are spoken by
the PA and linked from the project set (Listing 6, line
8); the guard fetches them when it pulls the closure of
the requester’s BearerRef: the BearerRef links to its
membership certificate (Listing 4), which links to the
policy set at line 4. Trust logic enables an authorizer (the
SA) to evaluate policy rules spoken by another party (the
PA) to determine if that party “says or believes” that the
request is valid according to its own policies (lines 5-6
of Listing 7); attribution is sound across inference. Of
course, the authorizer may add restrictions of its own.
Listing 8: Guard policy for a cloud provider to authorize control of a
slice. The caller must be a member of the slice with suitable privilege
by the policy of its controlling authority (SA).
defcon guardPolicySliceControl() :- {
approveSliceControl(?Subject, ?Slice) :-
?SA := rootID(?Slice),
?SA: slice(?Slice, ?Project),
sliceAuthority(?SA),
?SA: memberPriv(?Subj, ?Slice, control, _).
}.
Similarly, Listing 8 shows an exemplary policy used by
a provider as a condition to authorize a caller to control
a slice, e.g., to approve a resource request for the slice.
The slice is also associated with its own group whose
members have various roles in the slice, and may obtain
these privileges through group delegations according to
the policy of the controlling principal—the slice’s SA. As
with all groups, the members may have been endorsed by
different MAs in this federated system, e.g., they may be
associated with different institutions.
Once a request for cloud resources is authorized, a
provider may limit, delay, or reject the request based on
a separate resource allocation policy. This policy may
consider arbitrary attributes of the user identity, slice, or
project, and/or attributes of their approving authorities.
For example, a simple policy might be to treat projects as
a unit of accounting, analogous to accounts in AWS.
3.3 Protected Objects and ACLs
Cloud services enable their users to assemble sets of vir-
tual resources, including VMs, images, storage buckets,
and network links—slivers. Advanced cloud systems like
AWS enable account owners to control access to these
resources for users within their accounts. (AWS accounts
are identity domains and also are similar to projects in that
all slivers are linked to an account.) AWS-IAM allows
account owners to organize their objects within a hierar-
chical name space, manage groups of users, and attach
policies to groups of users and objects (e.g., objects with
common name prefixes) governing access on the basis of
user and group identities.
While AWS is controlled by a single provider, the
group and naming mechanisms outlined above are suffi-
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ciently powerful to extend these features to a federated
system. CFlo enables users to manage their own groups
and control access to their objects on the basis of those
groups or groups created by others. The objects and
groups may originate anywhere within the system. What
is needed is to add fine-grained ACLs to objects, including
slivers.
Listing 9: Guard policy for a cloud provider to authorize control of a
protected cloud object (a sliver of a slice). The caller must have control
privilege over the containing slice.
defcon guardPolicySliverControl() :- {
approveSliverControl(?Subj, ?Sliver) :-
sliverOf(?Sliver, ?Slice),
?SA := rootID(?Slice),
?SA: memberPriv(?Subj, ?Slice, control, _).
}.
GENI bases access to a sliver on a requester’s role in
the containing slice. Listing 9 gives an example of a
guard rule for control of a sliver under the GENI model.
It simply checks that the requester has control privilege
in the sliver’s slice under the policy of the controlling SA.
The structure is similar to Listing 8, but it illustrates the
association of the sliver with its slice (line 3). CFlo asserts
a sliverOf statement in a set when a sliver is created
(see below), along with a name and other attributes. The
sliver set links to a name entry, an ACL set, and the
containing slice; the closure of all of these sets are fetched
into the context for guard operations involving the sliver.
Listing 10: Guard policy for a provider to authorize access to a sliver.
If it is a network sliver from another provider then that provider must
be locally accepted as a peer aggregate. The sliver provider must grant
access according to its policy.
defcon guardPolicySliverAccess() :- {
approveSliverAccess(?Subject, ?Sliver) :-
?CP := rootID(?Sliver),
aggregate(?CP),
?CP: sliverPriv(?Subj, ?Sliver).
}.
An ACL is a logic set containing a list of policy rules
each stating that a specified identity or group (or a con-
junction/intersection of groups) has access to the pro-
tected object. Listing 10 shows how CFlo checks access
to a sliver according to its ACL, by querying an access
condition (sliverPriv at line 5). Note that the sliver
may be associated with a different provider: the rule iden-
tifies the provider (line 3), validates it as a qualifying peer
(e.g., endorsed by a common root anchor), and checks
sliverPriv access according to its policy. The ACL is
a set of rules to infer sliverPriv. This access is based
on any rules installed in the ACL set, or control over the
containing slice. Rules are added to the ACL by a guarded
operation that requires control over the sliver.
3.4 Stitched Interconnection
While it may seem odd to operate on slivers across
provider boundaries in Listing 10, CFlo uses this to au-
thorize stitching operations on cross-aggregate network
links—dynamic circuits. ExoGENI defines a sliver type
called stitchport to represent a logical network endpoint
that is stitchable at an adjacent switch. Abstractly, a stitch-
port occupies some tag that is unique among other end-
points in a network zone of location that is controlled by a
single provider. An endpoint of a network link—a locally
attached circuit or a slice dataplane network (VPC)—is
assigned a VLAN tag that is unique within the contain-
ing provider’s network, which may be zoned for scaling.
VLANs may be stitched to node slivers (VMs), or to other
VLANs (with tag translation). Cross-provider stitching
occurs at zone borders. Example code and explanation
omitted for space: one column.
A key element of this scenario is that adjacency implies
trust among the adjacent providers, who are cooperating
to establish a virtual network spanning providers within
a federation. As with examples above, the provider who
executes the operation is trusted to respect and enforce
the federation policy. In general, providers control their
own domains, and any compliance with external policies
is inherently voluntary. Participants respect these poli-
cies because they agreed to do so as a condition of their
cooperation. The federation trust structure and root en-
dorsements ensure that they do not expose themselves to
other parties who are not trusted to respect rules within
the federation.
4 Evaluation
We evaluate logical federation by running representative
workloads on a cluster of SAFE instances loaded with
CFlo trust scripts for cloud federation. Each SAFE in-
stance is a Scala process serving a REST API to invoke
its trust scripts. For these experiments, we evaluated the
cost of logical trust with a multi-threaded load generator
process that invokes the CFlo trust scripts directly accord-
ing to synthetic request mixes designed to demonstrate
and stress specific functions and behaviors in a federated
cloud. The SAFE engine and scripts handle all certifi-
cate generation, validation, and logical policy compliance
checking needed to implement these functions. The point
is to show that these trust functions for a federated cloud
can be implemented compactly using scripted logical trust
(about 600 lines), and that the resulting implementation
is fast enough to use in practice.
In a real deployment, each individual cloud site man-
ager and each control server (e.g., an authority for slices
or projects) is a server that possesses an RSA keypair (it
is a principal) and runs a private SAFE engine as a local
companion process. Each server uses the REST API to in-
voke its trust scripts in its local engine through a protected
socket. Each server trusts its local engine and scripts to
fetch and validate relevant certificates for its clients, to
perform all access checks for its policy, and to generate
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certificates with its keypair and post them as needed, as
programmed in its CFlo scripts.
We measure the client-perceived end-to-end latency
for canned sequences of operations that implement ba-
sic cloud functions as described above. For example, a
user U1 creates a project and delegates membership to
U2, who requests to create a slice in the project, and then
populates the slice with resources (e.g., VMs), perhaps
provisioned from multiple sites and linked together in
various ways. We measure the combined costs for all
trust-related functions needed for these sequences: all
round-trip script calls, certificate handling, posting/shar-
ing certificates through the shared certificate store, script
interpreter costs, and logic query prover/inference costs.
We exclude costs for any actual manipulation of cloud
resources (e.g., virtual machine provisioning) that would
occur after request authorization is complete: those op-
erations are implemented at a different layer (e.g., Exo-
GENI/OpenStack), and their costs are independent of the
logical trust architecture.
For these experiments we serve the SAFE/CFlo calls of
multiple participating principals on the same engine. In
this way we measure the throughput that each engine can
achieve under a heavy logic service mix that is representa-
tive of all the trust-related functions for a federated cloud.
In a real deployment these costs are spread across many
servers (e.g., one per principal) in parallel: capacity scales
with the size of the federation. The system’s only fun-
damental scaling bottleneck is the underlying certificate
store—a scalable key-value store. However, our bundling
approach results in higher ratios in the logic set cache
than the cloud servers would see in practice, reducing
costs for fetches and signature checking.
Each SAFE/CFlo engine instance runs on a four-core
KVM (Intel Xeon CPU E5520 @ 2.27GHz) with 12 GB
of RAM and 1Gb/s Ethernet. One-way network delay
between two instances is 0.46 ms. The certificate store
runs on five similar VMs running Riak 2.1.4 [43] with
a replication degree N = 3 and R = 1, W = 3. Each
posted logic set is materialized as a certificate with a
2048-bit RSA signature. Tokens and principal IDs are self-
certifying 256-bit SHA hashes (44-byte base64-encoded).
The logic payloads of certificates range from 467-840
Unicode characters. All keypairs are pre-generated.
For these experiments, we created a synthetic federa-
tion with a root, ten cloud providers, and two authorities
of each type (MA, PA, SA). We created 20K federation
users, 10K of whom are team leaders, 10K projects (one
for each leader), 5000 slices from users who have del-
egated membership in randomly selected projects, and
tens of thousands of slivers. For the stitching experiments
we created slices spanning all providers, and linked their
dataplanes in rings while creating additional slivers.
Note that the cost for each request depends only on
the number of certificates linked into the logic sets that
are relevant to it, and the complexity of the CFlo policy
applied to them: the certificate linking abstraction enables
a server to identify and fetch the relevant certificates as
needed. In particular, the cost for a request scales with
the number of principals involved in that request—for
example, the length of the delegation chain for a slice per-
mission (capability). The load generator selects principals
and objects randomly for each request, so the scale of the
system—the total number of principals and objects and
the number of participating cloud servers— influences
only the effectiveness of the logic caches in each server,
and not the processing costs for each request. The cost
per principal or per request of using trust logic is the
same at 100K principals/sites or a million principals/sites.
Cloud operation # CFlo # CFlo Latency Throughput
posts queries (ms) (ops/sec)
Create user/PI 4 N/A 57.1 104
Lookup user/PI N/A 1 7.3/7.8 605/544
Create project 4 1 61.4 107
Delegate project 2 N/A 29.1 206
Lookup project N/A 1 7.8 543
Create slice 4 1 71.7 86
Lookup slice N/A 1 7.7 672
Name slice 2 N/A 28.3 209
Create sliver 2 1 42.8 178
Intraslice stitch 2 3 48.9 137
Create stitchport 4 1 73.7 95
Interslice stitch N/A 2 21.1 282
Table 2: Latency and throughput of selected high-level cloud oper-
ations. We report the 95 percentiles in each cloud operation scenario.
All measurements are taken from the test harness. Latency includes
network delays between the test harness and the logical server and be-
tween the logical server and the storage. Peak throughputs are obtained
at concurrency level C = 30. Latencies are measured with C = 1.
Table 2 lists standard operations and their 95% latencies
and peak throughputs on a single 4-core SAFE instance.
Each high-level operation is implemented as a sequence
of underlying CFlo API calls, including those shown in
Table 1. The load generator is multi-threaded, so the
sequences are interleaved. Figure 3 shows the distribution
of latencies at both granularities: complete sequences, and
individual primitive operations within the sequences. The
results reflect latencies in the tens of milliseconds to issue
certificates due to signing and posting costs, and much
lower costs for the more common verify operations due
to caching and other factors, as expected. Fetch latencies
due to cache misses are visible in the latency distributions.
We also performed experiments with multiple SAFE
instances in which each principal is assigned randomly to
an instance, which performs all operations requested by
that principal. This shows that the code can run in a fully
distributed deployment, but the results do not add much
insight. They show additional costs to fetch and share
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(b) Latency of CFlo operations used to implement each type of
cloud operation, shown as a CDF of per-operation latency for
the combined CFlo operation stream.
Figure 3: Latency of cloud operations and CFlo operations for synthetic federated trust scenarios. Underlying CFlo, operations such as
checking compliance and posting certificates have different cost. Posting is slower due to signing costs and post latency; compliance checks
can be faster due to set/certificate caching. In CFlo, end-to-end compliance checking can be completed within 3 ms for most operations.
Latency includes network delay and is measured under concurrency level C = 4.
Figure 4: Raw inference time for access checks against an ACL of
groups, as a function of ACL length and group delegation depth.
The logical inference costs are a few hundred microseconds for
checks that are more complex than are likely to occur in practice.
certificates through the shared store; this cost is sublinear
in the number of certificates involved in each request, and
is determined by access latency to the store. The fetches
are partially parallelized according to the structure of the
linked DAG.
These results show that operation costs for logical trust
are practical for real deployments. The logical trust model
is flexible and can represent a wide range of trust dele-
gations and access policies concisely. It makes it possi-
ble to build and operate complex federations—and other
multi-domain applications—with a small amount of “ex-
tra” code to capture trust concerns.
For these typical operations and scenarios in the cloud
federation example, SAFE identifies and retrieves a tightly
bounded superset of relevant certificates for each trust de-
cision automatically, and the cost of compliance checks
is linear with proof length. However, more complex poli-
cies may show higher costs, particularly for disjunctive
policies (complex ACLs, cross-federation with multiple
trust anchors). The multiple branches force the prover to
search each branch looking for a proof. For example, a
user request for access may search a long list of groups in
an ACL, looking for one that includes the requester.
To illustrate this concern and focus on the cost of the
logical reasoning itself, Figure 4 shows the logical infer-
ence cost for access checks against a list of groups in
an ACL, as a function of the length of the ACL list and
the depth of delegation of the user’s membership in a
single group in the list. Costs grow with the number of
disjunctions (ACL length), as well as the cost to traverse
the group delegation chain to form the proof of access.
This delegation cost is linear in SAFE due to the use of a
secondary index.
Overall, the results suggest that logical inference is
cheap in the common case given that the certificate link-
ing structures constructed by the CFlo scripts focus the
prover on relevant logic content, and prune out extraneous
statements. Thus logical trust is cheap in the common
case: cost grows with the complexity of the policies, but
we pay only for the policy complexity that we use.
5 Related Work
PlanetLab. The PlanetLab [42] network testbed is an
early example of a distributed cloud. The terms slice
and sliver and our exemplary model of slice-grained ac-
cess control and signed capability-based delegations for
projects and slices—as used in GENI—is derived from
PlanetLab. We show how to implement these (and many
other trust features that go beyond PlanetLab) in a unified
and flexible logical system that can also capture a wide
range of alternatives summarized below.
Cloud federation standards. The OGF Open Cloud
Computing Interface (OCCI) standard API for cloud ser-
vices [41]. An IEEE working group is developing stan-
dards for cloud peering (Intercloud Interoperability and
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Federation IEEE P2302), supported by an Intercloud
Testbed Initiative [30]. Papers summarizing the effort
and its trust architecture include [12, 13]. Briefly, it pro-
poses federated identity management that encompasses
the providers, with common trust anchors (e.g., cloud
exchanges) certifying the providers (similar to the trust
structure in this paper), and provider groups (trust zones)
that reflect varying levels of trust of the providers. It
raises the problem of how to incorporate dynamic trust
into certificates issued by the anchors; we show how to
solve that problem.
FIRE. The EU-FIRE federation architecture [47] plans
a similar certification of identity providers and brokering
services from a federation trust anchor, and rules-based
authorization by participating providers. BonFIRE [32]
uses a similar structure and supports OCCI.
Grid. The evolution of security architecture for grid
computing [25] reflects similar concerns and choices. For
example, many deployed grids today bridge web single
sign-on (SSO) identity services such as Shibboleth [40]
to a PKI-based certificate system for hands-free user con-
trol; examples include recent versions of MyProxy [10],
the Short-Lived Credential Service portal (SLCS), and
several others. GENI MemberAuthority (MA) is similar
to these; they are also known as identity brokers. Many
grid systems employ a service called Virtual Organiza-
tion Management Service (VOMS [4]) to manage user
membership in Virtual Organizations (VOs), which are
groupings of principals spanning multiple identity do-
mains. The VOMS issues credentials as X.509 attribute
certificates signed under its own keypair and binding a
user’s public key to one or more roles scoped to a named
VO. VOs are similar to groups or projects in this paper.
Logical trust. Trust/authorization logic [2, 34, 23,
31, 38, 22, 3, 1, 46] is a unifying formalism that can
capture these attribute-based mechanisms and policies
declaratively and concisely, minimizing the need for cus-
tom software, formats, and protocols to implement each
design choice. The contributions of this paper (and of
SAFE)—generalized certificate linking with a common
certificate store, programmable scripting, and layered
cloud federation—are independent of the trust logic in
use. We prefer to use a standard logic (Datalog) to bal-
ance expressive power, tractability, and accessibility for
practical use. In fact, Datalog-with-says is provably the
most expressive tractable logic for trust: other logics are
either less powerful and lack essential features such as
conjunction (SPKI/SDSI [23, 36]) or objects (RT0 [38]),
or are merely syntactic variants of Datalog, or else are
intractable and are therefore (in our view) not suited to
practical use. One contribution of this paper is to show
that Datalog is sufficient to represent cloud federation
needs without these more complex logics.
Grid-inspired research has yielded several PKI-based
trust systems that are logical in that they combine roles
and delegations with some form of declarative policy [35].
Examples include the PERMIS [18, 17] system used in
European grid initiatives. These systems generally follow
the approach pioneered by SPKI/SDSI, but they introduce
custom policy languages. Most recently, FLANC has
been proposed as a custom logic for software-defined
network exchanges (SDX) [27], but it is no more powerful
than Datalog with constraints [37], or else it is intractable.
GENI-ABAC. GENI uses custom certificate formats
and custom validation code to implement its trust model,
but alternative support for logical trust exists based on the
ABAC software from USC-ISI [24], which is based on the
RT family of logics [38]. We contributed substantially to
the GENI-ABAC design. However, GENI abandoned log-
ical trust in favor of more ad hoc approaches for reasons of
expediency in the face of various practical concerns: diffi-
culty in identifying relevant credentials and passing them,
difficulty in integrating with established software in mul-
tiple languages, and lack of expressiveness. This paper
shows how to address these practical concerns via cer-
tificate linking, passing certificates by reference through
a shared repository, certificate caching, decoupling of
logic concerns from the application into trust scripts, in-
tegration of SAFE as a local process that interprets trust
scripts and is accessed through a REST API, and use of a
Datalog-complete trust logic with a standard syntax and a
lightweight service-oriented implementation.
6 Conclusion
SAFE is a trust management system that uses a trust
logic to represent policies, endorsements, and delegations.
SAFE supports semantically rich certificates and a logic-
based authorization engine implemented in a comprehen-
sive framework that materializes logic sets as certificates
and stores them as linked DAGs in a common key-value
store. CFlo uses SAFE to implement the GENI trust and
naming model, and extends it to support richer access
control, cross-slice peering, and federation peering.
Trust logic is useful as a specification tool for federated
cloud architecture, independent of the implementation.
With SAFE, logical trust also enables a practical and
concise implementation using declarative policy. This en-
ables deployments to use a wide range of trust structures
and policies specified in declarative logic, using the same
software base. The policies and trust structure may evolve
over time without modifying the software.
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